Abstract. The Egli-Milner power-ordering is used to de ne verisimilitude orderings on theories from preference orderings on models. The e ects of the de nitions on constraints such as stopperedness and soundness are explored. Orderings on theories are seen to contain more information than orderings on models. Belief revision is de ned in terms of both types of orderings, and conditions are given which make the two notions coincide.
Introduction
Belief revision and verisimilitude involve very similar notions. In both cases we wish to select a theory according to some notion of`closeness' to a given theory. In the case of belief revision, we are given a sentence, and the selection is from all the theories that contain the sentence. In the case of verisimilitude, the given theory represents the truth, and we are directly given the family of theories from which to select. But the criterion is the same: we seek a theory in the family of theories which is closest to the given theory.
From a technical perspective, however, the two topics have received di erent treatments. Our aim in this paper is to formalise the intuitive relations between the two topics by providing maps which de ne one concept in terms of the other. We will also consider the topic of preference relations in our analysis. Preference relations 17, 5, 8] were de ned to give a semantics to default reasoning. Since the relationship between default reasoning and belief revision is so close 10], preference relations are also relevant for belief revision. The nodes show the three topics which we interrelate. The arrows represent the de nitions used to translate between the concepts, and are labelled by the de nition number in the paper. For example, de nition 4 shows how to de ne a belief revision function from a preference relation. The paper explores the properties of the translations. Firstly, we will study the how the postulates typically imposed on the three concepts fare under the translation mechanisms. Secondly, we examine under what conditions the above diagram commutes. For example, suppose we obtain a belief revision function from a preference relation by passing through a verisimilitude relation, using de nitions 7 and 11. Do we get the same result if we proceed directly, using de nition 4?
We do not attempt a thorough review of any of the three relevant elds, such reviews being readily available elsewhere (eg, 4, 3] for belief revision, 1, 6] for verisimilitude and 8] for preference relations). A brief introduction to verisimilitude is given in section 3.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses belief revision and preference relations. Section 3 introduces verisimilitude. Section 4 gives the results concerning the interrelationships between the conditions which can be imposed on preference relations and verisimilitude relations. Section 5 discusses under which circumstances the diagram commutes, by exploring the compositions of the de nitions. Finally, section 6 draws conclusions.
Preliminaries. We assume a language L which has the usual boolean connectives, a class M of interpretations of the language, and a relation in M L. We assume that behaves classically with respect to the connectives. If A L is a set of sentences, The set of theories over L is T . If A 2 T , Ctg(A) = fB 2 T j A Bg (the theories containing A). A theory A is complete if 2 A or : 2 A for each 2 L; it is consistent if 6 2 A or : 6 2 A for each 2 L. The set of complete and consistent theories is denoted CT .
We will need to make use of the fact that m 2 Mod(Th(n)) i Th(m) = Th(n) i n 2 Mod(Th(m)). This is proved as follows. First assume m 2 Mod(Th(n)); then, for all 2 L, n implies m , so Th(n) Th(m). Now suppose n 6 ; so n : , so m : , so m 6 . Thus, Th(m) Th(n). This is the only place in the paper at which we appeal to the classical behaviour of . Now suppose Th(m) = Th(n); then n implies m , so m 2 Mod(Th(n)). The other half is proved similarly.
If 6 is a relation on the set X and Y X, then y 2 Y is said to be 6-minimal in Y if 8y 0 2 Y (y 0 6 y ) y 6 y 0 ). We de ne Min 6 (Y ) = fy 2 Y j y is 6-minimal in Y g. We de ne # 6 Y = fx 2 X j 9y 2 Y x 6 yg, and " 6 Y = fx 2 X j 9y 2 Y y 6 xg. As usual, x < y means x 6 y and y 6 6 x.
Belief revision via preference relations
The classical preference relations approach to default reasoning works as follows. Suppose T is some default information expressed as sentences of the language L. We assume some procedure for deriving from T a relation v T M M which measures how nearly an interpretation m satis es the default information. By convention, m v T n means that m satis es the default information as well as n does; we say m is preferred to n. There is a strong intuition that such preference relations should be transitive, though this is not always assumed in the literature. We will assume it. As to whether they are re exive or not, this may be taken as a matter of convention for one can always close under re exivity or take the strict (irre exive) counterpart of a relation. We will assume re exivity. Thus, De nition 1 A preference relation v is a ternary relation v M T M such that, for all T 2 T , the binary relation v T is re exive and transitive.
There are several properties of preference relations which we will sometimes need. Some, such as stopperedness, are well-known in the literature. Others, like the soundness property below, arise because we have made the parameter T explicit.
De nition 2 A preference relation v is The intuition behind the soundness property is that nothing is`closer' to satisfying T than its models. Stopperedness is well-known in the default reasoning literature, and tells us that we can nd minimal models of any theory. Abstractness means that the preference of an interpretation is determined only by the sentences that it satis es. The property of preservation of closed sets just tells us that certain useful operations on closed sets of interpretations return closed sets. Strong abstractness says that the preference order cannot make distinctions beyond the granularity of the logic. It represents an easy way to check whether the properties of abstractness and preservation of closed sets are satis ed, as the following lemma shows. In the standard account of preference relations, T is left implicit, and a xed ordering v is assumed. This more general account presents T as a parameter. In other work the authors and colleagues have described two preference structures; one based on the notion of`natural consequence ' 12] and one based on distances between models 13]. In 15], Schobbens de nes a preference structure for predicate logic based on correspondences.
Given a preference relation, we may de ne an inference relation. Let A and T be sets of sentences and a sentence in L. The inference relation j P(L) T L is de ned as follows:
A j T :() Min v T (Mod(A)) Mod( ) We will write j T instead of f g j T . The preference relations framework has its origins in circumscription 7] . Extensive work relating properties of v T to properties of j T can be found in the accounts of Makinson 9] , Kraus/Lehmann/Magidor 5] and Schlechta 14] .
The connection established between default reasoning and belief revision reported in 10] seems to be essentially the following. The statement that j T corresponds to the statement that 2 T , i.e. that revising the information T with will result in a theory that includes . In 10], the authors show that the relationship between the standard postulates for j and for correspond very closely under this translation. Thus, a preference relation can be used to de ne a belief revision operator.
De nition 4 ( in terms of v.)
This says that to revise T with , we look at the models of which are closest to T;
then we take the theory of those models. This de nition is the rst of the four de nitions promised by the diagram in the introduction. Notice the notation: we write v for the belief revision function de ned in terms of the preference relation v.
Verisimilitude via power orderings
The topic of verisimilitude concerns the measurement of closeness of theories to the truth. The idea is to de ne a ternary relation on theories:
Thus, the`truth' is represented as a theory. The actual truth is of course a complete theory (that is, for all 2 L, either 2 T or : 2 T), but many of the de nitions in the literature do not require this. Van Benthem's 18] constitutes a very readable survey of approaches as well as an analysis of the relations between verisimilitude and conditionals. We will again assume re exivity and transitivity.
De nition 5 A verisimilitude relation 6 is a ternary relation in T T T , such that, for all T 2 T , the binary relation 6 T is re exive and transitive.
The ternary relation allows us to select, from a given range of theories, one which is closest to the truth in an obvious way: If the family fA i j i 2 Ig of theories consists of the candidates at hand, then a particular A i is closest to the truth if it is 6 T -minimal in fA i j i 2 Ig, i.e. A i 2 Min 6 T (fA i j i 2 Ig). Of course there can be several incompatible theories among the candidates, all minimally close.
History of verisimilitude
The rst formal de nition of this relation is due to Popper 11] : for theories A, B and T, he de nes that A 6 . We can paraphrase the two conditions as: any model in B which might have been the true situation must also be a model in A (so A doesn't lose any models); and any model in A which couldn't have been the true situation must be a model in B (so A doesn't introduce any bad models).
We have that The rst means that 6 (P ) cannot strictly order \false" theories (that is, theories with at least one false sentence in them). Since that was the whole purpose of the enterprise, it seems su cient reason for rejection of 6 (P ) . The second item in the proposition says that the contradictory theory A (with no models) is an improvement on any theory B which shares no models with T. It is counterintuitive that the contradictory theory should be an improvement on anything. A proof of the rst item is given in 16, page 49]; the second is trivial to demonstrate. It should be noted that the second item is not seen as grounds for complete rejection of 6 (K) ; it is still widely discussed. A survey of approaches to verisimilitude can be found in 1].
Power-ordering approach to verisimilitude
The power-ordering approach to verisimilitude proceeds in the following way. We assume that L is propositional, and that the truth is a single interpretation t in M, or equivalently, that it is the complete theory Th(t). By convention, we take t to be the interpretation in which every proposition is assigned true (we just rename the propositions to arrange this). The set M of interpretations has a natural order on it, given by m v t n i for all propositions p, n p implies m p; which says, of course, that m is as near to t as n is.
Thus, we have a natural order on interpretations which shows how they approximate the truth. We want an order on theories. Since a theory T may be viewed as a set of interpretations (namely Mod(T )), we may use a technique well-known in Computer Science called the power-ordering or Egli-Milner ordering; it tells us how to lift an relation on points to sets of points. It says: if R is a relation on X then R + is a relation on P(X), de The 
Conditions on verisimilitude relations
A great many conditions on verisimilitude relations have been studied; for example, see 18]. However, the conditions that we will describe here seem to be yet more! The following conditions will be used in the remainder of the paper.
De nition 10 A verisimilitude relation 6 1. is sound if for any satis able theory T, the theory A is 6 T -minimal in T i T A.
This is the analogue of soundness for preference relations; it says the best theories are those that include the truth (and possibly more). The other conditions given above may seem less natural, but it will be seen that they arise naturally from seeing verisimilitude in terms of the power-ordering construction.
Belief revision from verisimilitude
We have so far de ned a belief revision operator in terms of a preference relation (slightly generalising the standard way; de nition 4), and we have shown how to de ne verisimilitude in terms of preference and vice versa (de nitions 7 and 8). We now complete the diagram in the introduction by giving a de nition of belief revision in terms of verisimilitude.
To revise T with , we look at the theories which contain , and pick among those the ones which are closest to T: De nition 11 ( in terms of 6.)
Remark 12 The similarity in structure between de nitions 4 and 11 may be seen by the following:
We now have the following de nitions to enable us to inter-de ne preference relations, verisimilitude relations and belief revision operators:
The remainder of the paper will explore properties of these de nitions. First, in the next section, we examine the relations between the constraints given for preference relations and verisimilitude relations. We answer such questions as: what conditions must be imposed on on 6 in order to guarantee that v 6 is stoppered? Then, in the following section, we explore the round trips: what happens if we begin with a preference relation, convert it into a verisimilitude relation, and then back again into a preference relation? How do the two preference relations relate? The same question can be asked about the other way around, starting with a verisimilitude relation and doing a round trip via a preference relation. We also examine under what circumstances the two ways of de ning belief revision coincide, i.e. when 6 = v .
Interrelating the conditions
In this section we examine how the conditions given for preference relations and verisimilitude relations translate using the de nitions of v 6 and 6 v .
We start with a lemma about de nition 7 which will be used a lot in this and the next section. It says that, in the power-ordering approach to verisimilitude, the theories closest to T selected from the family of theories containing B are precisely those whose models are closest to being models of B. In other words, the best theories are those with the best models,`best' being relative to a given constraint.
Proof Let 6 be 6 v . 
Composing the de nitions
In this section we look at whether the diagram given in the introduction commutes. First we consider a round trip: suppose we begin with a preference relation, calculate the verisimilitude relation according to de nition 7, and return to a preference relation via de nition 8. Intuitively we expect to arrive back at the same preference relation, since the verisimilitude relation contains much more structure than a preference relation. A verisimilitude relation contains information about partial, incomplete situations whereas a preference relation just orders (total) models. Going from v to 6 freely generates a particular`canonical' ordering of theories, which from the point of view of v contains a lot of redundancy. Going the other way forgets this extra structure.
Indeed, it is su cient to impose the relatively benign condition of abstractness on v in order to guarantee that the round trip preserves the preference relation. 
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The other round-trip is less well-behaved. If we go from a verisimilitude relation to a preference relation and then back again, there is no guarantee that we will recover the original verisimilitude relation. The intuitive reason has already been stated: the verisimilitude relation contains a lot of structure, which is jettisoned by de nition 8 and then a canonical version of which is freely generated by de nition 7. However, we should expect that the round-trip will preserve the relation for complete theories. Proof Since 6 is abstract, so is v 6 . Since A is complete and consistent, it is equal to Th(m) for some m (indeed, any m 2 Mod(A)). Similarly, B = Th(n) for some n. The reasoning from the second formulation to the third uses the fact that v 6 is abstract in a similar way to the proof of the previous proposition.
We may formulate some conditions on 6 which will guarantee that the round-trip via a preference will return exactly the same verisimilitude relation. These conditions are rather strong, forcing 6 to order incomplete situations in a way compatible with the way it orders complete ones. This is the role of the conditions split and join in the following proposition. The requirement of strong abstractness is there for the technical reason that it guarantees that certain sets are closed.
Proposition 17 If 6 is strongly abstract and satis es split and join, then 6 v 6 = 6.
Proof Note that v 6 is strongly abstract (proposition 14 (6) ) and therefore it is abstract and preserves closed sets (3). We want to show A 6 T The conditions required for this proposition are relatively weak, as one might expect, in view of the fact that verisimilitude relations potentially contain more information than preference relations, but those verisimilitude relations which are generated from a preference relation do not contain any surprises. The conditions required in the next proposition are stronger, because we have to constrain the verisimilitude relation more. 6 Conclusions and outlook
We have given an intuitive de nition of belief revision in terms of verisimilitude, and shown close connections between the preferential models approach to belief revision and the power-ordering approach to verisimilitude. The connection may be succinctly summarised as follows. Preference relations order models according to how close they are to some given theory, while verisimilitude relations order theories according to the same criterion. We have shown how to extract a verisimilitude relation from a preference relation and vice-versa, and have shown su cient conditions to prove that the notions are inter-de nable. In general, verisimilitude relations contain more information than preference relations, because they say how to order partial theories as well as total models. Moving from a verisimilitude relation to a preference relation discards this extra information, while moving in the opposite direction freely generates a canonical version of it.
Further work will complete the triangle of section 1 by nding de nitions of a preference relation and verisimilitude relation in terms of an arbitrary belief revision operator. Of course, a de nition of v in terms of already exists in the literature, by going via the nonmonotonic inference operator j and using the representation theorems of 5] and others.
Therefore, we can also construct 6 by applying de nition 7; but more likely, there is a more interesting way of constructing 6 directly from which exploits the extra freedom of a verisimilitude relation.
